doctrine

Imagine doctrine, philosophy, and military strategy as an interwoven structure—complex, constantly shifting, and reflective of the cultures that birthed them. Every doctrine, when zoomed into, reveals layers of bias, context, and limitation, much like a fractal’s repeating patterns. Now, we explore this web, pulling apart threads of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Thucydides, examining how their doctrines disintegrate when viewed through a postmodern framework that rejects absolute truths.

Doctrine is not linear. It doesn't flow from past to present in a simple, logical progression. Instead, it branches out like a fractal—repeating patterns of human nature, power, and warfare, each time warped by the specific context. The beauty of postmodernism is that it revels in this fragmentation, acknowledging that any overarching narrative is flawed, incomplete, and often, deceiving.

Consider Clausewitz’s “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” In this view, war is inherently rational—a tool to achieve a political goal. But zoom in closer, and we see how this assumption crumbles under the weight of modern warfare. Postmodern warfare isn’t clean or rational. It’s chaotic, shaped by actors who aren’t interested in playing by the rules. Insurgencies, guerrilla tactics, and asymmetric warfare expose the cracks in this grand narrative, much like the Vietnam War shattered the myth of Western military superiority. The U.S. tried to impose Clausewitzian strategy on a conflict that was guerrilla, local, and fundamentally political in a way they didn’t comprehend. When you zoom in further, Clausewitz’s doctrine, bound by its time, becomes a relic.

Zoom out, and you see Sun Tzu. His flexible, almost zen-like approach to warfare—advocating deception, psychological manipulation, and adaptation—transcends time because it’s rooted in fluidity. But even Sun Tzu, when examined through a postmodern lens, shows limitations. His doctrine worked in Warring States-era China, where warfare was as much a diplomatic game as it was military. But what happens when warfare becomes digital? Can we deceive algorithms the way Sun Tzu advocates deceiving human generals? Can psychological warfare work in an era of information overload? Even Sun Tzu, flexible as he was, is limited by the constraints of his context. Yet his teachings remain fractal—capable of reshaping themselves in response to the changing nature of conflict. Zoom in too far, however, and you see the fine grain of a system also bound to a particular historical reality.

Now, let’s examine Thucydides. His analysis of power politics in The History of the Peloponnesian War established realism—the idea that power and self-interest drive state behavior. But postmodern thought throws a wrench into realism’s gears. Realism assumes that states are coherent entities, acting in their own interest. But what about non-state actors? Corporations? Guerrillas? Terrorists? The internet itself? In a world where power is diffuse and decentralized, realism becomes just another partial truth, unable to fully explain how non-traditional forces shape the battlefield. Thucydides, like Clausewitz, is bound to a time when nation-states were the only players in the game.

Let’s imagine warfare as a fractal, endlessly repeating but always changing in scale and shape. At one level, you have conventional military doctrine—rigid, structured, hierarchal. Zoom in, and you see guerrilla warfare—decentralized, adaptive, opportunistic. Zoom out again, and you encounter cyber warfare, where the terrain is not physical but digital, where doctrines like Sun Tzu’s manipulation of information take on new meaning, but where the traditional warrior’s mindset feels out of place.

Postmodernism revels in these gaps. It tells us that no doctrine can be universal, and in warfare, the general who understands this is the one who prevails. The postmodern general recognizes the limitations of doctrine as much as its strengths. They see the cracks in the narrative and exploit them, much like a guerrilla force exploits the overconfidence of a conventionally superior army.

Let’s look at Iraq. The U.S. entered with a doctrine of “shock and awe,” believing that overwhelming force would lead to swift victory. But the insurgency that followed exposed the flaws in this doctrine—no amount of firepower could win the hearts and minds of the local population. The Taliban understood this fractal nature of conflict—they didn’t need to win on the battlefield. They only needed to outlast the occupiers. In the same way, Sun Tzu would have admired the long game they played, but even Sun Tzu couldn’t have foreseen the ways in which propaganda and social media became the new weapons in this war. Deception works differently in a world where everyone has access to real-time information.

So, where does that leave us?

The hard facts, the ones we exploit, are not universal. They are shifting perspectives, moments of clarity in the fog of war. The postmodern general doesn’t cling to a single doctrine but recognizes that all doctrines are flawed, biased, and limited by the context of their creation. The trick is to use these limitations—understand when your enemy is trapped by their own doctrine and exploit their blind spots.

Consider the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Traditional military doctrine suggested that Russia’s superior numbers and resources would lead to a quick victory. But the Ukrainians exploited the gaps—using information warfare, guerrilla tactics, and Western cyber-intelligence to disrupt Russian advances. The traditional narrative of military superiority was shattered by the fluid, adaptable, and fractured nature of modern conflict.

The key is understanding the fractured truths within doctrine. The hard facts aren’t solid—they’re fluid. The truth is, no strategy holds up forever. The adaptable general is the one who sees the battlefield not as a fixed landscape but as a constantly shifting puzzle of perspectives, each with its own truths and lies.

The future of military strategy lies in embracing the fractal nature of conflict. There will always be multiple levels of warfare happening simultaneously—physical, psychological, digital, informational. The postmodern general will be the one who can navigate these levels, recognizing the biases and flaws in each layer of doctrine. They will be the one who understands that in a fractal world, the most effective strategy is the one that can shift, evolve, and adapt faster than the enemy’s ability to react.

In postmodern warfare, there are no grand narratives, no universal doctrines. There are only fragmented truths, shifting perspectives, and endless opportunities for those willing to exploit the gaps.

#FractalWar #DoctrineInPieces #ExploitingGaps #PostmodernGeneral #AsymmetricWarfare